

Message Text

PAGE 01 STATE 158065
ORIGIN SS-15

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /016 R

66011

DRAFTED BY IO/UNA:BJSHARP

APPROVED BY IO/UNA:JFTEFFT

S/S-O:KDSCOTT

-----015395 220054Z /62

O 212140Z JUN 78

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0000

S E C R E T STATE 158065

EXDIS FOR AMB. YOUNG FROM UNA

FOLLOWING REPEAT KINSHASA 6429 SENT ACTION SECSTATE INFO
BONN, BRUSSELS, LONDON AND PARIS JUN 20.

QUOTE: S E C R E T KINSHASA 6429

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: CG, EAID, PDEV, PEPR

SUBJECT: US DEMARCHE TO MOBUTU ON REFORMS

REF: A) STATE 148155; B) PARIS 19427; C) KINSHASA 6393

1. SUMMARY: I MADE DEMARCHE TO MOBUTU ON REFORMS JUNE 20,
DISCUSSING AND LEAVING WITH HIM TEXT OF MEMORANDUM AGREED TO BY
PARIS FIVE. I ALSO CONVEYED TEXT OF PRESIDENT CARTER'S JUNE 11
LETTER, WHICH MOBUTU READ CAREFULLY. MOBUTU EXPRESSED GREAT IRRI-
TATION AT PUBLICITY DEMARCHES WERE RECEIVING IN FOREIGN MEDIA,
AND BRISTLED MOMENTARILY AT THE LETTER'S REFERENCES TO CORRUPTION,
ARRESTS AND EXECUTIONS. ON THE WHOLE, HOWEVER, HE SEEMED TO TAKE
SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 158065

THE MEDICINE REASONABLY WELL, PLEADING FOR PATIENCE AND HELP
DURING THE NEXT THREE DIFFICULT MONTHS AT THE END OF WHICH HE
PROMISED WE WOULD SEE SIGNIFICANT RESULTS IN ZAIRE'S IMPLEMENTATION
OF REFORMS. END SUMMARY.

2. I MET ALONE WITH THE PRESIDENT FOR 45 MINUTES AT HIS
RESIDENCE THIS MORNING, JUNE 20. AS HE SO OFTEN DOES, MOBUTU
IMMEDIATELY TOOK THE OFFENSIVE BY EXPRESSING HIS GREAT IRRITATION
AND DISTRESS OVER THE PUBLICITY BEING GIVEN THE DEMARCHES BY
INTERNATIONAL MEDIA. HE CITED AN EARLY MORNING BROADCAST BY

THE VOICE OF GERMANY REPORTING IN DETAIL HOW THE PARIS FIVE WERE LEANING HARD ON MOBUTU TO DEMOCRATIZE, BE GOOD TO THE SHABANS, NORMALIZE RELATIONS WITH ANGOLA, ETC. THE REPORT EVEN HAD THE FRENCH AND BELGIANS ARGUING OVER WHETHER THE DEMARCHE SHOULD BE MADE COLLECTIVELY OR INDIVIDUALLY. THIS KIND OF PUBLICITY, MOBUTU COMPLAINED WITH EVIDENT FEELING, WAS MOST UNHELPFUL. I AGREED AND ASSURED HIM THAT OUR INTENTION HAD BEEN TO HANDLE THE MATTER WITH MAXIMUM DISCRETION. (MOBUTU APPARENTLY HAD NOT HEARD, AND I DID NOT MENTION, A SIMILAR REPORT BY THE VOICE OF AMERICA THAT MORNING.)

3. I THEN BEGAN BY NOTING THE IMPORTANCE OF THE COOPERATIVE EFFORT TO ASSIST ZAIRE DURING THE RECENT ATTACK ON SHABA. THE ACTIVE ROLE PLAYED BY THE US WAS A CLEAR DEMONSTRATION OF OUR DETERMINATION TO SUPPORT OUR AFRICAN FRIENDS FACING THREATS TO THEIR UNITY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY. RESPONDING WITH ANIMATION, MOBUTU SAID HE MEANT EVERY WORD OF HIS LETTER THANKING PRESIDENT CARTER FOR OUR HELP. THE US RESPONSE HAD GREATLY ENCOURAGED NOT ONLY ZAIRE BUT MANY OTHER AFRICAN COUNTRIES; IT HAD SHOWN THAT WE AT LAST RECOGNIZED THE SERIOUSNESS OF SOVIET-CUBAN STRATEGY AND HAD NOT LOST OUR WILL OR ABILITY TO TAKE AVION.

SECRET

PAGE 03 STATE 158065

4. I WENT ON TO NOTE FURTHER THAT IN WHATEVER THE US DID OUR AFRICAN FRIENDS COULD BE SURE THAT WE RESPECTED THEIR INDEPENDENCE AND SOVEREIGNTY. (MOBUTU INTERJECTED THAT THIS, ABOVE ALL, WAS WHAT WAS MOST IMPORTANT TO HIM.) I SAID IT WAS WITH THESE PRINCIPLES IN MIND, BUT WITH THE CONVICTION THAT A FRANK DIALOGUE WAS NECESSARY BETWEEN GOOD FRIENDS, THAT MY GOVERNMENT HAD INSTRUCTED ME TO DISCUSS THE SITUATION WE NOW FACED TOGETHER.

5. I SAID THAT, AS MOBUTU ALREADY KNEW FROM THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR, THE PARIS FIVE HAD MADE CERTAIN RECOMMENDATIONS FOR STEPS ZAIRE MIGHT TAKE IN BOTH THE ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL SPHERES. MOST OF THESE RELATED TO REFORMS WHICH PRESIDENT MOBUTU HAD HIMSELF ANNOUNCED AND WHICH WE HAD APPLAUDED (E.G., PRESIDENT CARTER'S MESSAGE OF ENCOURAGEMENT TO MOBUTU FOLLOWING HIS JULY 1 SPEECH LAST YEAR). BUT FOR A VARIETY OF REASONS, IMPLEMENTATION OF THESE REFORMS HAD BEEN SLOW OR INCOMPLETE, AND THE PARIS FIVE CONSIDERED THE PRESENT SITUATION -- PARTICULARLY SINCE KOLWEZI -- WAS SUCH AS TO REQUIRE URGENT ACTION.

6. IN THE ECONOMIC SPHERE, I MENTIONED SPECIFICALLY THE NEED TO MOVE AHEAD QUICKLY WITH MANAGEMENT REFORMS, NOTABLY PLACING FOREIGN EXPERTS IN THE CENTRAL BANK AND FINANCE MINISTRY, AND BETTER UTILIZATION AND CONTROL OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE. EVIDENCE OF THE LATTER WAS PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT TO OUR ABILITY TO JOIN OTHER DONORS IN MEETING ZAIRE'S SHORT-TERM IMPORT REQUIREMENTS. MOBUTU REMINDED ME THAT HE HIMSELF HAD TAKEN THE INITIATIVE IN ASKING FOR FOREIGN EXPERTS, AND THAT IF THERE HAD BEEN DELAYS IT WAS AS

MUCH THE FAULT OF THE DONORS AS OF THE GOZ FOR NOT PROVIDING PROMPTLY A DIRECTOR GENERAL FOR THE BANK OR EXPERTS IN CUSTOMS AND INSPECTION DES FINANCES. IN ANY CASE, HE SAID, WE COULD BE SURE THAT ZAIRE WAS READY TO MOVE IN THESE AREAS AS SOON AS THE DONORS WERE.

7. TURNING TO POLITICAL REFORMS, I SAID WE HAD LONG RESPECTED MOBUTU'S

POLICY OF NATIONAL RECONCILIATION AS A KEY ELEMENT IN BRINGING TO
SECRET

PAGE 04 STATE 158065

HIS COUNTRY UNITY OUT OF THE CHAOS OF THE 1960S. THE PARIS FIVE HAD AGREED THAT THIS POLICY SHOULD BE PURSUED WITH RENEWED VIGOR, PARTICULARLY IN SHABA WHERE THERE SEEMED TO BE A NEED TO CONVINCE THE PEOPLE THAT IT IS MORE IN THEIR INTEREST TO ACTIVELY SUPPORT THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT THAN TO JOIN DISSIDENT OR OPPOSITION ELEMENTS. WHILE REALIZING THAT MOBUTU KNOWS BETTER THAN ANY FOREIGN OBSERVER HOW THIS MIGHT BEST BE ACCOMPLISHED, THE PARIS FIVE NEVERTHELESS CONSIDERED A NUMBER OF POSSIBLE STEPS. THESE INCLUDED A PUBLIC AFFIRMATION THAT THERE WOULD BE NO REPRISALS TAKEN AGAINST THE CIVILIAN POPULACE IN THE WAKE OF KOLWEZI; THE CREATION OF A SPECIAL FUND TO FACILITATE THE RETURN AND RESETTLEMENT OF REFUGEES AND EXILES; THE STRENGTHENING OF A DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT AND SHABAN LEADERS, PERHAPS THROUGH THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL SOME OF WHOSE MEMBERS HAD IMPRESSED US AS SINCERELY WANTING TO MAKE MORE USEFUL CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE NATION'S WELL-BEING. I MENTIONED ALSO THAT FOR MANY SHABANS FAZ WAS THEIR MAIN POINT OF CONTACT WITH THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT, AND THAT UNFORTUNATELY THERE WERE REPORTS OF WIDESPREAD INCIDENTS OF MALTREATMENT BY SOLDIERS OF THE LOCAL POPULACE.

8. MOBUTU LISTENED TO ALL THIS BUT SAID LITTLE. HIS FEW COMMENTS WERE PRIMARILY DEFENSIVE: THERE WERE MORE LUNDAS AND OTHERS FROM SHABA SERVING IN THE GOVERNMENT THAN MOST PEOPLE REALIZED; FAZ MISBEHAVIOR WAS REGRETTABLE BUT INVOLVED SOME RATHER THAN MOST OR ALL SOLDIERS; WHENEVER HE WENT TO SHABA -- AS HE WOULD AGAIN SHORTLY -- THE SITUATION BECAME CALM. IF MOBUTU INTENDS TO TAKE NEW INITIATIVES FOR RECONCILIATION WITH SHABA, HE DID NOT INDICATE THIS DURING OUR CONVERSATION.

9. I THEN RAISED ANGOLA, NOTING THAT ZAIRE'S WORKING OUT SOME FORM OF ACCOMMODATION SEEMED TO BE THE OTHER NECESSARY ELEMENT FOR RESOLVING THE SHABA PROBLEM. HERE MOBUTU RESPONDED MORE READILY. HE FIRST RECALLED HIS PREVIOUS ATTEMPTS TO EXTEND AN OLIVE BRANCH
SECRET

PAGE 05 STATE 158065

TO NETO, NONE OF WHICH HAD BEEN SERIOUSLY RECIPROCATED. NOW, HE SAID, KAUNDA WAS OFFERING TO PLAY A MEDIATING ROLE, AND THIS WAS BEING SUPPORTED BY THE FRENCH AND OTHERS. (HE MENTIONED IN THIS CONTEXT THAT JOURNIAC WOULD SOON BE COMING TO SEE HIM.) MOBUTU SAID HE WAS WILLING TO WORK WITH KAUNDA, BUT FIRST HE HAD TO HAVE

WRITTEN ASSURANCES THAT ZAMBIA WOULD NOT AGAIN ALLOW ITS TERRITORY TO BE USED FOR ATTACKS AGAINST ZAIRE. WHEN I ASKED WHETHER KAUNDA HAD NOT GIVEN SUCH ASSURANCES DURING THEIR RECENT MEETING IN LUBUMBASHI, MOBUTU SAID HE HAD BUT THAT VERBAL ASSURANCES SIMPLY WERE NOT ENOUGH. HE REPEATED THAT HE FIRST HAD TO CONCLUDE AN "ACCORD" WITH ZAMBIA BEFORE ANYTHING COULD BE DONE WITH ANGOLA.

10. FINALLY, I MOVED ON TO PRESIDENT CARTER'S LETTER, WHICH MOBUTU READ CAREFULLY FROM BEGINNING TO END. HE MADE NO COMMENT UNTIL HE CAME TO THE REFERENCES TO CORRUPTION AND TO ARRESTS AND EXECUTIONS.

WHAT, HE ASKED WITH EVIDENT IRRITATION, DID WE SPECIFICALLY HAVE IN MIND WITH RESPECT TO "CORRUPT ELEMENTS ASSOCIATED IN THE PUBLIC MIND WITH THE ZAIRIAN GOVERNMENT"? I RESPONDED WITH A FEW EXAMPLES: REPORTS THAT LAST YEAR IMPORTANT SUMS OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE EARNED FROM COFFEE EXPORTS BY ZAIRIANS -- SOME OF WHOM ALLEGEDLY OCCUPIED HIGH OFFICIAL POSITIONS -- WERE NEVER REPATRIATED. ANOTHER EXAMPLE WAS ILLEGAL PROFITEERING BY WELL-PLACED ZAIRIANS IN ESSENTIAL IMPORTS, INCLUDING IN SOME INCIDENCES PL-480 RICE WHICH INHIBITED OUR EFFORTS TO GET IT TO THE POOR AT REASONABLE PRICES. AND THEN THERE WERE THE EVERYDAY INCIDENTS WHERE FAZ SOLDIERS -- REPRESENTATIVES OF THE GOVERNMENT IN THE PEOPLE'S EYES -- EXTRACTED MONEY FROM INNOCENT CIVILIANS. (HERE I RECOUNTED THE FREQUENCY WITH WHICH MY OWN HOUSEHOLD SERVANTS HAD TO PAY FIVE ZAIRES TO GENDARMES IN ORDER TO MAKE THEIR WAY HOME SAFELY FROM WORK.) MOBUTU DID NOT CONTEST THESE EXAMPLES, AND ACKNOWLEDGED THERE HAD INDEED BEEN MAJOR PROBLEMS WITH COFFEE. HOWEVER, HE CONTENDED THAT MUCH OF THE CORRUPTION EXISTED IN THE PRIVATE RATHER THAN PUBLIC SECTOR AND SAID HE INTENDED TO CRACK DOWN HARD ON THE MAJOR CULPRITS. I CONCLUDED WITH THE GENERAL COMMENT THAT TOO MANY OFFICIALS SEEMED TO PLACE THEIR SECRET

PAGE 06 STATE 158065

PRIVATE INTERESTS AHEAD OF THE PUBLIC GOOD.

11. MOBUTU ALSO ASKED, AGAIN WITH SOME IRRITATION, WHAT WE MEANT BY A "PATTERN OF ARRESTS AND EXECUTIONS". I MENTIONED FIRST THE IDIOFA HANGINGS, WHICH I RECALLED HAVING RAISED WITH MOBUTU LAST FEBRUARY AND WHICH HAD CAUSED US CONSIDERABLE CONCERN. THEN THERE WERE THE APRIL ARRESTS AND EXECUTIONS OF THOSE ACCUSED OF COUP PLOTTING, WHICH HAD AGAIN CAUSED US TO EXPRESS OUR CONCERN. MOBUTU ACKNOWLEDGED THAT IDIOFA HAD NOT BEEN RIGHT. HOWEVER, HE DEFENDED THE APRIL EXECUTIONS AS BEING NECESSARY AND JUSTIFIED PUNISHMENT FOR THOSE INTENDING TO SPREAD URBAN TERRORISM.

12. MOBUTU CLOSED OUR MEETING WITH A REQUEST THAT I ASSURE MY GOVERNMENT THAT HE IS AWARE OF THE NEED TO EXPEDITE IMPLEMENTATION OF REFORMS AND THAT HE WILL DO SO TO THE BEST OF HIS ABILITY. AT THE SAME TIME, HE MADE A STRONG PLEA THAT WE TRY TO UNDERSTAND THAT HE SIMPLY CANNOT DO EVERYTHING AT ONCE OR OVERNIGHT. WHAT HE NEEDED, HE SAID, WAS OUR HELP TO GET THROUGH THE NEXT, DIFFICULT THREE MONTH

PERIOD, DURING WHICH TIME HE WOULD EFFECT IMPLEMENTATION "IN AN ORDERLY WAY". BY OCTOBER, WHEN ANOTHER MEETING OF DONORS WOULD BE HELD, WE WOULD SEE THAT REAL PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE.

13. COMMENT: ALTHOUGH ONLY TIME WILL REALLY TELL, I BELIEVE MOBUTU TOOK HIS MEDICINE PRETTY WELL CONSIDERING THE NUMBER AND POTENTIALLY PROVOCATIVE NATURE OF THE MATTERS WE DISCUSSED. HE OBVIOUSLY KNEW WHAT WAS COMING, ALTHOUGH IT WAS EVIDENT THAT SOME OF THE MORE DELICATE POINTS

RAISED IN THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER TOUCHED TENDER NERVES. IF MOBUTU FAILED TO BE MORE SPECIFICALLY RESPONSIVE ON SUCH MATTERS AS RECONCILIATION WITH THE SHABANS, WE SHOULD BEAR IN MIND HIS EXTRAORDINARY PRIDE AND SENSITIVITY TO APPEARING TO ACT ON HIS OWN INITIATIVE RATHER THAN
SECRET

PAGE 07 STATE 158065

IN RESPONSE TO OTHERS' PRESSURE. HIS COMMENTS ON ANGOLA LEAD ME TO BELIEVE THAT HE MAY IN FACT BE WILLING TO MOVE CAUTIOUSLY TOWARD SOME FORM OF ACCOMMODATION SO LONG AS HE IS ASSURED THAT OTHERS WILL CONTINUE TO SUPPORT ZAIRE'S SECURITY IN ADDITION TO HELPING OUT WITH DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS. I WILL BE COMPARING NOTES LATER TODAY WITH MY BRITISH AND BELGIAN COLLEAGUES, BOTH OF WHOM MADE THEIR DEMARCHES IMMEDIATELY AFTER MINE. THE GERMAN CHARGE IS STILL AWAITING WORD AS TO WHEN HE WILL BE RECEIVED. CUTLER
UNQUOTE VANCE

SECRET

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 26 sep 1999
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: DEMARCHE, TRANSLATIONS, TEXTS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 21 jun 1978
Decaption Date: 20 Mar 2014
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 20 Mar 2014
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1978STATE158065
Document Source: ADS
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: IO/UNA:BJSHARP
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: 11652 GDS
Errors: n/a
Expiration:
Film Number: D780259-0662
Format: TEL
From: STATE
Handling Restrictions:
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1978/newtext/t197806115/baaaezaj.tel
Line Count: 247
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, TEXT ON MICROFILM
Message ID: 16324f7e-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ORIGIN SS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 5
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Reference: A) STATE 148155; B) PARIS 19427; C) KINSHASA 6393
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 03 may 2005
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 2177964
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: US DEMARCHE TO MOBUTU ON REFORMS
TAGS: EAID, PDEV, PEPR, CG, (MOBUTU, SESE SEKO)
To: n/a INFO USUN N Y
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odb://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/16324f7e-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Sheryl P. Walter
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
20 Mar 2014
Markings: Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014